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A M E R I C A N A N D V A T I C A N R E A C T I O N S TO T H E 
T I S O T R I A L 
By Walter U11 mann 
The trial and subsequent execution of Mgr. Jozef Tiso, one-time president of 
Slovakia, caused considerable commotion in certain American circles. In parti-
cular, it affected the sentiments of some Americans of Slovak origin who, for the 
most part, viewed the sentence as unjust and considered the execution of a Catholic 
preláte a simple act of revenge by an atheist, Communist-dominated government. 
The following is an attempt to trace briefly the events leading up to Tiso's trial 
and to examine American reactions to them, both in official circles and among 
spokesmen of various Slovak-American organizations in the United States, as well 
as their American Sponsors. 
As will be seen, the official American position differed sharply from the position 
of most of the various individuals and groups which sponsored Tiso's cause in the 
United States. Washingtons refusal to intervene in Prague on behalf of the accu-
sed lends itself to the potential charge that responsible U. S. officials were both 
influenced and misinformed by Prague and its Washington embassy and that the 
true nature of Tiso and his independent administration during World War II had 
been obscured. While it is certainly correct to say that the Czechoslovak Embassy 
in Washington and, for that matter, the Prague government presented their case 
as they saw it, there is no evidence that American unwillingness to come to Tiso's 
aid was motivated by the official Czechoslovak position. Rather, the extant docu-
mentation suggests that Washington steered an independent course and did not 
permit itself to be influenced by either Communist exaggerations or exiled pro-
Tiso elements. Abiding by the decisions reached by the Big Three on matters con-
cerning War Criminals and relying primarily on the intelligence provided by its 
own embassy in Prague, the United States government remained aloof. 
Similarly, the Holy See, which can hardly be accused of having fallen under 
Communist influence, abstained from any kind of direct or even indirect influence 
in Tiso's trial. While undoubtedly aggrieved over the trial and subsequent exe-
cution of a Catholic priest, it took great care not to permit the Tiso trial to spill 
over into a political issue of international dimensions. On the contrary, explicit 
Vatican documentation points to the difference between the trial of the Croat 
Archbishop Alojz Stepinac, whom the Holy See viewed as a persecuted spirituál 
leader, and Mgr. Jozef Tiso, President of war time Slovakia, who entered politics 
on his own accord against the express wishes of the Vatican. Hence, when Con-
gressman Alvin E. O'Konski of Wisconsin, one of Tiso's staunchest American 
defenders, compared Tiso's martyrdom to that of Stepinac', he was simply being 
more Catholic than the Pope. 
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On Easter Sunday, 1945, Tiso and members of his government crossed the Slovak 
border into Austria to seek refuge with the American troops who had just liberated 
the better part of that country 2 . The refugees were afraid of falling into the hands 
of the advancing Soviet army, now rapidly approaching the Slovak capital of 
Bratislava. Tiso and his group had no illusions about the fate that would befall 
them should they be taken captive by the Soviets. On the other hand, they thought 
they had reason to believe that, apart from decidedly more humane treatment, 
their chances of obtaining a fair trial for their activities during World War II 
would be considerably greater if it were conducted under the aegis of one of the 
Western victors. 
Although it may not be altogether possible to avoid comment on the acts of 
Tiso and his government during the years from 1939 to 1945, this is certainly not 
the main purpose of this study. Both his defenders and his detractors have amassed 
ample commentary on these issues over the thirty years since Tiso's trial and exe­
cution 3. What I wish to do here is simply to make a critique and evaluation of 
the American and Vatican positions in this matter. Both the Prague Embassy and 
the Department of State, as well as a number of members of Congress, were invol­
ved. The Embassy, by the very nature of its functions, reported extensively on 
the events preceding Tiso's trial and on the reactions to it in Slovakia and the 
rest of the country. While reports, stemming from Ambassador Laurence A. Stein-
hardt and his Prague staff had, on some previous occasions, proved to be super­
ficial or even patently falše, as was the čase in Steinhardťs prognosis of the out-
come of the 1946 elections, the U. S, Department of State had other sources of 
information at its disposal. Among others, it received numerous petitions on Tiso's 
behalf from Slovak exiles, some of them former members of Tiso's government 
who had succeeded in escaping from Slovakia. On the other hand, and represen­
ting the Czechoslovak side, the Department had to deal with the various protests 
and inquiries concerning the whereabouts of the fugitives addressed to it by the 
Czechoslovak government and its embassy in Washington. Finally, Congressmen 
from constituencies with considerable Slovak ethnic background were literally 
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 The text of the document of surrender to the United States Armed Forces by Tiso and 
members of his government may be found in K i r s c h b a u m , Jozef M.: Slovakia: 
Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. New York 1960, pp. 295—296. In-
terestingly enough, American sources did not consider Tiso's surrender to them as an 
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Williamson, Chief of the State Departments Central Europe desk, to John Hickerson, 
Acting Director, Office of European Affairs, the former merely refers to „the arrest of 
Dr. Tiso by the United States military authorities . . .". See Williamson to Hickerson, 
March 24, 1947, File 860 F. 00/3—2447, National Archives, Diplomatie Correspon­
dence, Czechoslovakia, Record Group 59. 
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Slovakia. An annual pro-Tiso publication of the Slovak League of America. Middle-
town/Penna., present a whole series of articles, of vastly differing quality, on the 
various aspects of Tiso and his government. 
302 
bombarded with petitions from a whole galaxy of Slovak-American organizations, 
most of which were highly sympathetic to Tiso, and requests for United States 
diplomatic Intervention on his behalf. 
As early as June, 1945, Vladimir Hurban, the Czechoslovak Ambassador in 
Washington, asked the United States government to hand over to Czechoslovak 
authorities Jozef Tiso and some half a dozen members of his former government. 
Prague informed Washington that Tiso and the others were „indicted for criminal 
offenses against Czechoslovakia, ranging from high treason, treason-felony, and 
kindred offenses — which they perpetrated in their office or for the benefit of 
Germany — to participation, in varying degrees, in a number of criminal offenses 
against public order, person, and private and public property, committed prior to 
and during the existence of the Bratislava regime" 4. Acting Secretary of State 
Joseph Grew replied that the request had been forwarded to Supreme Headquar-
ters Allied Expeditionary Forces and that British concurrence in the release of the 
Slovaks under indictment had been asked simultaneously *. 
It would appear that the British took a more legalistic view of the whole mat-
ter, or so at least it would seem from a directive sent by Secretary Acheson to the 
United States Ambassador in London. To be sure, contrary to the United States, 
the British government, in 1939, did indeed extend de facto recognition to the 
then Slovak Republic and, for the next two years, entertained consular relations 
with Bratislava. It may well be then that, in view of this, London's approach 
to the handing over of Tiso and his government to Czechoslovakia was influenced 
by these past relations. To ascertain the current British position in the whole mat-
ter, Acheson instructed the United States Ambassador in London to inform the 
British Foreign Office that „unless FonOff [sic] has urgent reasons for opposing 
delivery of S lovaks . . . [the U. S. State] Dept. shortly will request U. S. military 
authorities to release them to authorized Zecho [sie] [Czechoslovak] officials." 
The State Department, however, did not envisage following such a course in the 
case of „any members of the former Slovak State apprehended in the future" but 
saw „no objection to the release of Slovaks speeifieally requested by the Zecho 
[sie] Govt" 6. An urgent telegraphic request from the United States Embassy 
in Prague that „any further delay in delivery of the Slovaks [to Czechoslovak 
authorities], particularly since the prompt delivery of Laval to the French govern-
ment" would be „difficult to explain to the Zecho [Czechoslovak] Government", 
must have spurred the State Department further still 7. With no objection from 
London, the United States government now proeeeded with the necessary steps 
towards the handing over of Tiso and his party to Czechoslovak authorities. Con-
sidering the American position on Slovak traitors to be in harmony with the „Di-
rectives on United Nations Renegades and Quislings" previously agreed upon 
jointly with the British, Acheson subsequently informed Winant that the United 
4
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States Political Adviser in Germany had been instructed to request from the appro-
priate military authorities the release of the Slovak officials to Czechoslovakia, 
as originally requested by Hurban on June eighteenth8. 
On November 1, Ambassador Steinhardt informed the State Department about 
the prominent treatment given in the Czechoslovak press to the handing over of 
Tiso and the other members of the former Slovak government9. Immediately 
after their arrival in Prague, the prisoners were transferred to Bratislava, and 
for the next year both Slovak Communists and Democrats exploited the forth-
coming trial for their own propaganda purposes. The Communists were insisting 
on death sentences for Tiso and the other chief offenders, as well as an early trial 
before the elections of May, 1946. By such actions, they hoped to discredit Catholi-
cism and to weaken the traditional influence of the Catholic clergy over the Slovak 
electorate. The Slovak Democrats, on the other hand, were fearful that exposure 
of the wartime activities of the former president, who was also a Catholic priest, 
would seriously härm their own objectives in the forthcoming election. At this 
time, however, they may not have been all that concerned about the occasional 
instances of collaboration of some of their members with the Tiso regime, although 
this issue was later to cause them much embarrassment and to force the resignation 
from the Slovak regional government (Sbor poverenikov) of some of the ranking 
Slovak Democrats. On the contrary, since the Communists were in the habit of 
accusing almost everyone who differed with them of some sort of disloyalty, the 
frequent Communist diarges that the Slovak Democratic Party, as a result of the 
so-called „April Agreement" 1 0 with the Slovak Catholic Episcopate, had com-
promised itself with one-time Tiso followers, did not seem to carry that much 
weight. At any rate, the tactic obviously backfired on it propagators, as is best 
evidenced by the election results of May, 1946, when the Democratic Party troun-
ced the Slovak Communists by a spectacular margin of two to one. So much, then, 
for the purely political implications of the trial. 
Apart from these political considerations, the trial had its judicial and psycho-
logical aspects. To the Communists, Tiso's guilt was a simple matter: the evils 
committed during the six years of his presidency rested most heavily on him, as 
head of the former Slovak State. The Democrats, however, took a more complex 
but less punitive view. They recognized that Tiso was guilty, but they argued that 
he had been a member of the moderate faction of the one-time Slovak govern­
ment; they saw in this sufficiently extenuating circumstances to spare his life. 
Furthermore, they contended that Tiso's death would provide the Slovak Sepa­
ratist cause with a martyr and would severely strain the relationship between 
Czechs and Slovaks. 
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 Acheson to Winant, October 4, 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States (1945), 
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 On the agreement concluded March 30, 1946, between the Slovak Democrats with 
former followers of the Tiso regime and other Slovak Catholic elements, see P r e -
č a n , Vilém: Slovenský katolicizmus před februárom 1948. Bratislava 1961, pp. 242— 
247. 
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Under these conditions, preparations for the trial took over a year, so that it 
did not begin until December, 1946. During the preparatory period, and even 
more so during the months of the trial itself, Tiso's supporters made numerous 
attempts to have the United States government intervene in the proceedings to 
spare his life. Typical of such interventions was a communication from Congress-
man Chauncey W. Reed (Illinois) to Secretary of State Byrnes. Reed expressed 
concern over Tiso's fate and feared that he might be executed. He asked Byrnes 
whether Washington might be able to do something in the matter " . Byrnes' reply 
was swift and to the point. He explained that it was United States policy to adhere 
to the appropriate United Nations resolutions in all matters concerning war crimi-
nals. He then told Reed about the wartime activities of Tiso, presumably on the 
assumption that the Congressman was unaware of the wartime role of the man 
on whose behalf he had been asked to intercede by some of his constituents. In 
a terse concluding Statement, Byrnes simply stated that the United States „did 
what it had to do" and that „the United States government therefore [was] 
unable to take further action in this matter" 1 2. 
Reed's letter was but one of the many which members of Congress, on occasional 
Catholic bishop, and various Slovak fraternal organizations in the United States 
addressed to the Secretary of State, assorted other officials in the State Depart­
ment and, on occasion, President Truman himself. It is difficult to ascertain whether 
the various pleas on Tiso's behalf were motivated by an honest belief that an 
injustice was being perpetrated by the Prague government or whether they were 
primarily acts of compassion requesting clemency on Christian grounds. As far 
as can be judged today, some thirty years after the actual events, it would appear 
from the overall textual quality of the petitions that not all their signatories were 
fully aware of the portents of the documents they signed. Mostly working people 
of Slovak origin, it is likely that in signing they had followed the advice of their 
parish priests and other local leaders, a custom not uncommon among various 
ethnic groups in the United States who had been politicized by an ambitious leader­
ship. There were, to be sure, occasional exceptions to the pro-Tiso trend among 
American-Slovak communities. Thus, the Slovak Workers' Society of Cleveland, 
under the signatuře of its president, Andrew Burin, and secretary Jerry Marsik, 
both of whom were visibly angered by two „memoirs" of the „so-called ,Slovak 
National Council' of London", signed by Peter Pridavok and addressed to the 
United States Ambassador in London, protested to the Department of State; the 
Society claimed that the publication of these „memoirs" in the American Slovak 
newspaper Jednota (Middletown, Penna.) merely represented the feelings of „a 
handful of discontented Slovaks who call themselves the ,Slovak National Coun­
cil' [and] have been and are the apologists for the former Tiso puppet regime 
of Slovakia" 1S. 
1 1
 Reed to Byrnes, December 23, 1946, File 860 F. 00/12—2346, National Archives, Di­
plomatic Correspondence, Czechoslovakia, Record Group 59. 
1 2
 Byrnes to Reed, December 31, 1946, File 860 F. 00/12—3146, i b i d e m . 
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 Robert Crosser, member of Congress, to Secretary of State, October 16, 1945, File 860 
F. 00/10—1645, i b i d e m . Congressman Crosser forwarded the letter of the Slovak 
Workers' Society. 
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Form available records, however, it would appear that the Slovak Workers' 
Society, rather than the numerous pro-Tiso fraternal organizations, spoke for the 
minority. Irrespective of ists quality, the available evidence suggests quite clearly 
that pro-Tiso sentiment among American Slovaks was strong. Nor need we que-
stion the ability of its leadership in impressing its point of view upon the elected 
representatives of the United States government. Prodded by various organi-
zations, a number of Congressmen transmitted to Washington letters of support 
for Tiso from their constituents and, on occasion, added support of their own 14. 
While the Congressmen's knowledge of the actual State of affairs surrounding 
the Tiso trial did not always bespeak any particular insight into world politics or 
even the cause they championed, and while a simple cover letter obviously did not 
necessarily indicate the transmitter's own point of view, it is quite evident from 
the correspondence of the members of Congress that they espoused the cause which 
they were asked to plead. 
The typical petition on Tiso's behalf presented the rather simplified picture 
of a persecuted man and a Slovak State which, under Tiso's leadership, was a 
staunch bulwark against Bolshevism rather than an ally of Nazi Germany. Addi-
tionally, the simple fact that the accused was a preláte of their church must have 
strengthened the petitioners' belief in his innocence. Since few of the actual peti-
tioners had had occasion to live in Slovakia during the six years of its indepen-
dence, their image of the „old country" was obviously not an accurate one. Equally 
nebulous must have been the visions entertained by some of their congressional 
Sponsors. Thus, B. W. Kearney, representing the 31st Congressional district of 
New York, in a cover letter for one of his constituents, referred to the pending 
trial of Mgr. Tiso „to be held in Slovakia or that part of the country known as 
Bohemia". One can only hope that Kearney's familiarity with the intrinsic part 
of the Tiso trial exceeded his geographical knowledge of the part of the world 
where it was to be held and where many of his constituents came from 15. 
Not infrequently, Congressmen added their own pleas to those of their con-
stituents. For example, Roay J. Madden of Indiana and Alvin E. O'Konski of 
Wisconsin wholeheartedly supported Tiso's cause. Madden stressed the fact that 
„over 80 percent of the Slovak-American fraternal organizations have forth-
rightly declared themselves to be of the opinion that Tiso was a hero in the defense 
of the best interests of the Slovak people". He cited Slovakia's progress during 
the years of its independence and compared it favorably with any similar period 
of its existence under Czechoslovakia 16. While Madden's contention about pro-
14
 Congressmen Kearney (N. Y.), Philbin (Mass.), Huber (111.), Kelley (Penna.), and 
Muhlenberg (Penna.), as well as Bishops Griffin (Trenton, N . J.) and Toolen (Mobile, 
Ala.) had interceded in Tiso's behalf. See their various Communications to the United 
States government for the period from June, 1946, until about April, 1947, in File 860 
F. 00, i b i d e m. 
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 Kearney to Department of State, November 18, 1946, File 860 F. 00/11—1846, i b i -
d e m . 
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 U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, Ist Session, March 31, 1947, 
Congressional Record, 93, part 3, 2928—29. 
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Tiso sympathies may well have been statistically correct, it cannot be assumed 
that all the American-Slovak signatories of the various petitions on his behalf 
were sufficiently informed about the whole issue to enable them to make a dis-
passionate decision in a question which, for obvious reasons, was of an emotional 
nature. Where knowledge of Tiso's wartime activities was lacking, such lacunae 
were readily remedied by pious exhortations by clerical leaders who pointed to 
Tiso's stand against Bolshevism. It was obviously not in the best interest of the 
petitioners similarly to belabor Tiso's Christian stand against Nazism. While it 
is understandable that the pro-Tiso leaders among American Slovaks were con-
spicuously silent about this aspect of Tiso's political activities, Madden's silence 
about it was bound to make his listeners question his own impartiality in the mat­
ter. Even worse, it must have made them question his actual knowledge of the 
complex subject to which he addressed himself. Similarly, Madden's second con-
tention about Slovakia's progress during the years of independence is at least open 
to question. Present-day students of the brief history of the Slovak State see in 
this so-called progress little more than a systematic economic exploitation of Slo­
vakia by Nazi Germany ". What materiál progress Slovakia experienced during 
the years of its independence was usually brought about by Germany, and, one 
hardly need add, conceived of and initiated primarily in the interest of the German 
military and its war effort rather than for the benefit of the Slovaks. For that 
matter, the build-up of Slovakia and the rapid industrialization of the country 
have grown even more rapidly since 1945, and surely neither Madden nor his Slo­
vak constituents would také pridě in an achievement brought about by Commu­
nism. Slovak growth during World War II, whether or not actually exceeding 
similar development in any comparable period under Czechoslovak rule, was 
largely artificial and brought about by Outsiders, rather than an intrinsic achieve­
ment of the Tiso regime. 
While some of Madden's facts might have been incorrect and he himself insuffi-
ciently informed about the cause to which he lent his name, Congressman Alvin 
O'Konski's impassioned exhortations border on the ludicrous. Comparing „the 
brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso to the immortal General Mihailovitdi 
and the immortal Archbishop Stepinac", he accused the Czechoslovak Communists 
of murdering Tiso on the basis of „trumped-up charges". What seemed to bother 
the Wisconsin Congressman even more than the actual execution of Tiso was the 
failure of any United States government agency to protest it „just for the re-
cord" 1 8. 
Official Washington did not see in its refusal to intercede for the accused Tiso 
a threat to its honor and, Madden's and O'Konski's pleas notwithstanding, re­
fused to interiére with what was considered a domestic affair of Czechoslovakia. 
On the matter of German economic exploitation of Slovakia during these years, see 
H o e n s c h , Joerg K.: The Slovak Republic, 1939—1945. In: V. M a m a t e y and 
R. L u z a : A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918—1948. Princeton/N. J. 
1973, pp. 271 ff. 
U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, Ist session, April 23, 1947, 
Appendix to Congressional Record, 93, part 11, A 1872. 
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Similar appeals, addressed directly to various United States government agencies 
by American-Slovak fraternal organizations, feil on equally deaf ears19. If the 
Department of State or any of its officials responded at all, the replies were usually 
limited to some factual explanations about the wartime activities of Monsignor 
Tiso and his government. It was, after all, for that and not for his Christian stand 
against Bolshevism that he was being judged. Thus, Francis Williamson, the Chief 
of the State Departments Central Europe desk, informed William D. Hassett, 
President Truman's secretary, of the true nature and character of Tiso's govern-
ment; in so doing, he conveyed a more accurate picture to the President than those 
who now championed the cause of Tiso and an independent Slovakia. Williamson 
used the occasion to reply to a memorandum forwarded by Hassett with an atta-
ched request from Congressman Matthew Connolly. The Congressman had appealed 
to Truman on Tiso's behalf, and now Hassett was seeking more information 
before answering Connolly's letter. Williamson supplied such information, min-
cing no words in his diaracterization of some of the Slovak petitiohers. He observed 
that some of the champions of Tiso's cause were „war criminals" convicted by 
Slovak courts: „The Department [did] not consider it appropriate at present 
to reply to letters from the Slovak Action Committee, whether signed by [Ferdi-
nand] D'urcansky or not20 ." 
Such a categorical reply from high American government officials must have 
been extremely disappointing to the petitioning Slovaks and their American Spon-
sors. Lest they should think, as some of them did, that official Prague and its Wa-
shington Embassy had successfully conditioned American thinking in the Tiso 
case, they must have been doubly disenchanted to see a similar lack of sympathy 
for the cause of the accused Slovak President from the Holy See. Although Tiso 
was a Catholic preláte, the Vatican made no diplomatic efforts on his behalf. Nor 
did papal diplomacy exert itself in the cause of an independent Slovakia. From 
its very beginning, in 1939, the Slovak State and its first president, Mgr. Tiso, had 
been viewed by the Vatican with mixed emotions. Although the Holy See esta-
blished diplomatic relations with Slovakia, it expressed reservations about the 
acceptance of high political office by a cleric. During the war years, Tiso's repu-
tation was tarnished by reports from the papal Charge d'affaires in Bratislava, 
Mgr. Giuseppe Burzio, which accused the President of being weak and failing to 
stem the radical faction in his own government21. Although Burzio was aware 
of the various internal and external pressures to which Tiso had been subjected, 
19
 Rev. Florian Billy, „Supreme Secretary" of the Slovak Catholic Federation in the 
U. S., was one of the most ardent defenders of Tiso and his cause. 
20
 Williamson to Hassett, March 31, 1947, File 860 F. 00/3—3147, National Archives, Di-
plomatic Correspondence, Czechoslovakia, Record Group 59. Ferdinand D'urcansky 
was the prime mover of most of the petitions. He was Slovakia's first Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and was one of those on the „war criminals" list, although he managed 
to escape from Allied custody. 
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 Burzio to Maglione [Vatican Secretary of State], September 18, 1941, Le Saint Siege 
et les victimes de la guerre, Janvier 1941—Décembre 1942, Vol. 8 of Actes et Docu-
ments du Saint Siege relatifs ä la seconde guerre mondiale (9 vols. to date; Vatican 
City: Libreria Editirice Vaticana, 1965), pp. 279—280. 
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in particular with respect to the Promulgation of the Slovak „Jewish code" 22, 
the Charge's reports from the Slovak capital provoked an uncomplimentary 
and merciless response from the Vatican Assistant Secretary of State, Mgr. Dome-
nico Tardini. Instructing Burzio to intercede directly with Tiso on behalf of the 
persecuted Jews, he called the Slovak leaders, Prime Minister Tuka and President 
Tiso, „lunatics". He concluded that they were „two m a d m e n . . . Tuka who acts 
and Tiso — the priest — who permits such action" 23. 
Shortly after, Tiso once again became the object of the Vatican's displeasure. 
On this particular occasion, Tardini called in the Slovak Minister to the Holy 
See, Karol Sidor, to verify reports according to which Tiso, in a recent speech, had 
equated Catholic social doctrine with the social teachings of Nazism. Sidor, who 
himself handed Tardini a text of the speech, expressed his astonishment as to „how 
Mons. Tiso — a professor of theology — could say such things which make people 
believe an untruth" 24. When Cardinal Montini, Assistant to the Vatican Secre-
tary of State, read the memorandum of the conversation between Tardini and 
Sidor, the added indignantly that if Tiso had indeed made the remarks attributed 
to him, he Holy Father might consider striking Tiso's name from the list of pre-
lates28. Although Tiso subsequently explained to Charge Burzio that he had 
been misquoted, Rome, while abstaining form Stripping him of his title of Mon-
signor, was obviously displeased28. 
Even after the conclusion of the war, the Vatican's position did not significantly 
change. While undoubtedly regretting the arrest of a Catholic preláte, the Holy 
See made no diplomatic efforts on his behalf. In November, 1945, only weeks 
after the handing over of Tiso to the Czechoslovak government, Harold H. Titt-
man, the Representative of the United States President to the Holy See, quoted 
22
 Burzio to Maglione. For a füll discussion of the Jewish question in Slovakia during 
World War II, see J e l i n e k , Y.: The Vatican, the Catholic Church, the Catholics 
and the Persecution of the Jews during World War II. In: Jews and Non-Jews in 
Eastern Europe. Ed. B. V a g o and G. L. M o s s e. Toronto 1974, pp. 221—255. 
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i b i d e m 478—479. 
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 Notes of Mgr. Tardini, October 21 and 23, 1941, Le Saint Siege et la guerre mondiale, 
Juillet 1941—Octobre 1942, Vol. 5 of Actes et Documents, pp. 273—274. 
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 Addendum of Montini, October 23, 1941, i b i d e m 274. Of special interest here is a 
footnote in the text, according to which Tiso „had been named a secret superannuary 
[papal] chamberlain on November 21, 1921 and appeared under this title in the 
Annuario Pontifico of 1922 (p. 608). The title had to be renewed with each new pon-
tificate. Neither Pius XI nor Pius XII had confirmed him, and his name no lon-
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26
 According to Karol Sidor, one-time Slovak Minister to the Holy See, Tiso did not 
seek renewal of his title of Monsignor with the new Pope, Pius XII. Hence, since 
„Monsignors die with the Pope who had nominated them", Tiso's title expired with 
the death of Pius XI. Since neither Tiso himself nor the Slovak bishop who, at the 
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Pope to strike Tiso's name from the list of prelates. For details, see S i d o r , Karol: 
Šest rokov pri Vatikáne. Scranton/Penna. 1947, pp. 59—60. 
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Monsignor Tardini and reported that „the Vatican had little sympathy for him 
[Tiso] since he had accepted [the] presidency without Consulting [the] Holy See 
and had carried out Nazi Orders [of] Jewish persecution against Vatican's 'vehe-
ment protests'". Tittman further wrote that the Vatican's only interest in the 
Tiso case was that he should obtain a fair trial which Tardini thought might be 
difficult, considering the national hatred involved27. In April, 1947, a mere two 
weeks before Tiso's execution, Ambassador Steinhardt had the following to say 
on the matter. The Prague archbishop, Josef Beran, and a ranking Slovak cleric, 
Mgr. Laznik, had recently returned from Rome with the news that „the Vatican 
is not backing Tiso" and that „Tiso assumed the [Slovak] presidency against the 
advice of the Vatican". As if this piece of news were not damaging enough to 
Tiso's cause, instructions from Rome to Czech and Slovak Catholics „to cooperate 
with the [Prague] government" all but killed any anticipated help from papal 
quarters. To justify itself against any future possible charges that the Holy See 
had abandoned one of its own, „a martyr for the faith", as Tiso was so frequently 
called by his supporters, the Vatican made clear the basic difference between Tiso 
and the persecuted Croat Archbishop Stepinac: „The latter was a spirituál leader, 
whereas, Tiso, as President of [the] Slovak State, had actively entered political 
life 28." As late as December, 1947, in a routine report from the Vatican, J. Graham 
Parsons, Assistant to the Personal Representative of the President of the United 
States to Pope Pius XII . transmitted the following opinion of Monsignor Dome-
nico Tardini, Vatican Under-Secretary of State; according to Tardini, „in Mon-
signor Tizo's [sie] time the Situation was unsatisfactory to the Vatican and as 
often was the case with political prelates, he paid no attention to suggestions and 
thoughts expressed from Rome" 29. 
The respective positions of Washington and Rome to refuse to come to the aid 
of the accused Tiso was further supported by a dispatch from John Bruins, Coun-
selor of the United States Embassy in Prague, and, in Steinhardt's absence, Charge 
d'affaires. In a communication to Washington during mid-February, Bruins told 
the Secretary of State rather bluntly that he [Bruins] „had no doubt whatsoever 
that Tiso [was] guilty 30. Although it is not likely that D'urcansky or any other 
of Tiso's defenders were familiär with the unsympathetic position taken by Wa-
shington, Rome, or the Prague Embassy, the official postures of these three places 
clearly underscored two important facts. Since no one, at that time, was likely to 
aecuse either Washington or the Vatican of pro-Communist sympathies, one ist 
bound to conclude that Tiso's conduet during his tenure of office was reprehen-
sible not only by Communist Standards of justice, but by the Standards of demo-
cratic governments as well. Moreover, and just as significantly, the political orien-
27
 Tittman to Secretary of State, November 11, 1945, File 860 F. 00/11—345, National 
Archives, Diplomatic Correspondence, Czechoslovakia, Record Group 59. 
28
 Steinhardt to Secretary of State, April 2, 1947, File 860 F. 00/4—247, i b i d e m . ' 
29
 Memorandum of a conversation between Parsons and Tardini, December 10, 1947, 
enclosed in Parsons to Secretary of State, December 10, 1947, File 860 F. 00/12—1047, 
i b i d e m . 
30
 Bruins to Secretary of State, February 13, 1947, File 860 F. 00/2—1347, i b i d e m . 
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tation of many of Tiso's defenders was clearly demonstrated: having themselves 
turned their backs on the democratic process, they now tried to invoke that same 
process to savé the skin of their one-time leader. 
On April 15th the verdicts on the former Slovak President and his Foreign 
Minister were pronounced. Both Tiso and D'urcansky were found guilty and 
sentenced to hang, the latter in absentia. The third accused, one-time Minister of 
the Interior Šaňo Mach, was hospitalized at the time of the trial and his case was 
deferred to a later dáte. On May 15, 1947, he was sentenced to thirty years impri-
sonment, only to be released by the Dubček government in May of 1968. As far 
as can be ascertained, he is free to this day. 
Four weeks before the announcement of the sentences, Washington had requested 
its Prague Embassy to comment on the fairness of the judicial proceedings 3 1. The 
Embassy replied that the „Tiso trial, which recently ended, was conducted in a 
fair and orderly manner". It further reported that „public attitudes in Slovakia 
have hardened somewhat against Tiso, mainly as a result of [the] introduction into 
evidence of a Vatican letter which stated [that the] ,Vatican considers Tiso a Hit-
lerian"' 3 2 . The Department of State seemed to concur with such an assessment 
of both Tiso's past and the fairness of his trial. In a communication to Peter P. 
Jurchak, President of the Slovak League of America, John Hickerson, on behalf of 
the Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, told Jurchak that „the public record 
of Dr. Tiso does not, in the judgement of the Acting Secretary, constitute a specific 
reason for any intervention by the [United States] Government". In particular, 
Hickerson noted Slovakia's adherence to the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, an act 
committed on November 25, 1941, under Tiso's presidency. Finally, „the records 
of his [Tiso's] trial show indisputably that Dr. Tiso agreed to the Slovak decla-
ration of war on the United States and the United Kingdom on December 12, 
1941". In view of all this, „the Acting Secretary does not consider that it would 
be appropriate for the [United States] Government" to accede to Jurchak's re­
quest for American diplomatic intervention on Tiso's behalf 3 3. Further comment 
on Czechoslovak reactions to Tiso's trial and the verdict came from Ambassador 
Steinhardt two days after the death sentence had been announced. He said that 
the sentiments in the Czechoslovak government had „veered sharply in favor of 
carrying out death sentence on Tiso and unless there is [an] unexpected develop­
ment, sentence [will] be carried out in [the] near future". As for the public reac-
tion to it, the Ambassador did not foresee major problems. He simply stated that 
„while the [Czechoslovak] government anticipates dissatisfaction in some quar­
ters with [the] carrying out of [Tiso's] sentence, it [did] not expect serious 
demonstrations or that they [would] be longlived" 8 4. 
The verdict in Tiso's trial soon came to be a political football in Czechoslovakia, 
with the Communist, Social Democrat and National Socialist parties favoring 
the death sentence, while the Slovak Democratic Party and the Catholic Peoples' 
3 1
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Party recommended mercy. According to yet another report of Steinhardt's, Beneš 
himself is reported to have favored the latter course3 5. When it came to the actual 
question of granting clemency to the accused, the National Court in Bratislava 
merely forwarded Tiso's request to Beneš, without any comment of its own. 
There was, however, support for mercy from the office of the Slovak Commissio-
ner of Justice (Poverenictvo spravedlnosti) and also a formal appeal to Beneš 
from the Council of Slovak Catholic bishops and from Bishop Čobrda, who wrote 
on behalf of the representatives of the various Protestant churches of Slovakia. On 
the other hand, the League of Slovak Partisans and representatives from the Slovak 
labor movement let Beneš know that they stood behind the death verdict and 
were in favor of its implementation 3 e. The President, who found it politically 
inexpedient to intervene, sidestepped the issue; he forwarded the matter to the 
Czechoslovak government. There, by a margin of seventeen to six, it was decided 
to let the verdict stand 3 7. 
Tiso was executed on April eighteenth. Contrary to his wish to be interred in 
Banovce, his one-time parish, Tiso was quietly buried in Bratislava. The govern­
ment chose to disregard Tiso's request for fear that burial in the small parish 
where he had been well known and had carried out his priestly functions might 
lead to manifestations of sympathy on his behalf. 
Although some demonstrations in favor of Tiso did indeed occur in Slovakia 
even before the announcement of the death sentence, his opponents, incited by the 
Communist-dominated trade unions and partisan organizations, staged major 
counter-demonstrations in Bratislava 3 8. Although for some time to come Slovak 
Democrats and Slovak Communists continued to use Tiso's trial as a method of 
hurling accusations at each other, the storm soon calmed. In the western-oriented 
provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, the effect was nowhere nearly as noticeable. 
By mid-1947, only groups of American Citizens of Slovak origin, continuously 
stirred by their leaders and exhorted by the now thoroughly discredited ex-mem-
bers of Tiso's government, persisted in honoring Tiso's memory, each in its own 
way. While the clergy limited its homage to requiem masses, the politicians thought 
it wisest to honor their departed leader by continuing appeals for Slovak inde­
pendence. The diplomatic files for 1947 reveal a number of such documents, addres­
sed to various agencies of the United States government and signed by the untiring 
D'urcansky. Since many of the leaders of the former Slovak State were per-
sonae non gratae in the United States, the Department of State found itself the 
recipient of petitions from places as distant as Rome and Buenos Aires. Like Jozef 
Tiso himself, the man who provided the impetus for some of the earlier petitions, 
they were quietly laid to rest in the Department's files, largely unanswered. 
3 8
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R E A K T I O N E N I N D E N V E R E I N I G T E N S T A A T E N 
U N D B E I M H E I L I G E N S T U H L A U F D E N T I S O -
P R O Z E S S 
Das Gerichtsverfahren und die daraufhin vollzogene Todesstrafe gegen Dr. Jo-
zef Tiso, den Präsidenten des Slowakischen Staates während des Zweiten Welt-
krieges, wurde von Amerikanern slowakischer Abstammung mit großer Anteil-
nahme verfolgt. Gut organisiert und oft von Tisos ehemaligen Mitarbeitern im 
Exil beeinflußt, unternahmen diese Kräfte alles, um Tiso vor der Vollstreckung des 
Urteils zu retten. Neben direkten Protestschreiben an amerikanische Politiker, ins-
besondere an den Staatssekretär Byrnes und an Präsident Truman, verstanden sie 
es auch, die Repräsentanten ihrer Wahlbezirke im Amerikanischen Kongreß für 
Tiso zu interessieren und sie zu einer direkten Intervention für Tiso im Ameri-
kanischen Kongreß zu bewegen. Aus den vorliegenden Quellen geht nicht immer 
einwandfrei hervor, ob dieses oder jenes Kongreßmitglied bei seinem Vorgehen 
lediglich das Anliegen seiner Wähler bei den zuständigen Federalbehörden in 
Washington förderte oder ob er selbst an einer entsprechenden amerikanischen 
Intervention Interesse hatte. 
Wie dem auch sei, als gute Volksvertreter folgten sie den Wünschen ihrer Wäh-
ler. Wenngleich nicht alle slowakisch sprechenden Amerikaner mit der Politik 
Tisos einverstanden waren — es ist nachweisbar, daß es unter den amerikanischen 
Slowaken auch Gegner Tisos gab —, war doch die für Tiso angestellte Lobby 
im Kongreß einflußreich genug, um die höchsten politischen Kreise Amerikas für 
den Fall Tiso zu interessieren. Trotz aller Bemühungen der Fürsprecher Tisos und 
trotz des oft wiederholten Arguments, daß Tiso ein anti-bolschewistischer Kämp-
fer sei, der nun von rachesüchtigen tschechischen Kommunisten und nicht von einem 
demokratischen Gericht verurteilt wurde, verhielten sich die amerikanischen Be-
hörden, insbesondere das State Departement, zurückhaltend. Sie lehnten es nicht 
nur ab, in Prag oder Preßburg für Tiso vorzusprechen, sondern sie waren auch 
hinsichtlich der wachsenden Zahl der Appelle verstimmt. Die Regierung in 
Washington entschloß sich deshalb, auf Appelle nicht mehr zu antworten, und be-
gründete diesen Entschluß mit der Behauptung, daß die meisten slowakischen 
Fürsprecher noch vor kurzem Feinde der Alliierten waren und sich jetzt nur als 
Demokraten aufspielten. 
Die negative Stellungnahme Washingtons rief eine große Enttäuschung bei den 
amerikanischen Slowaken hervor. Einen noch größeren Schock bereitete aber die 
Haltung des Vatikans, der es ebenfalls ablehnte, sich in die Angelegenheit einzu-
mischen und für den zum Tode verurteilten Priester vorzusprechen. Bereits zu 
Beginn des Tiso-Regimes im Frühjahr 1939 hatten vatikanische Kreise eine ambi-
valente Stellung gegenüber Preßburg eingenommen. Obwohl Msgr. Ignaz Seipel 
im Vorkriegs-Europa bereits ein Beispiel von Priester-Politikern abgegeben hatte, 
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hegte der Heilige Stuhl Zweifel an der Richtigkeit der Entscheidung Tisos, sich 
zum slowakischen Präsidenten wählen zu lassen. Als es nun während des Krieges 
slowakische Behörden für nötig fanden, mehr und mehr autoritativ aufzutreten, 
verstimmte dies den Vatikan in stdgendem Maße und führte gelegentlich, wie 
im Falle der slowakischen Judengesetze, zu offener Kritik an Preßburg. In dieser 
Beziehung waren die Depeschen des apostolischen Delegierten in Preßburg, Msgr. 
Burzio, besonders maßgebend und scheinen den vatikanischen Staatssekretär stark 
beeinflußt zu haben. Abgesehen von diesen Kritiken, die oft rein moralischer und 
philosophisch-theologischer Natur waren, hielt es die Vatikan-Diplomatie nach 
dem Kriege wohl kaum für richtig, sich nun für einen Ex-Verbündeten des Dritten 
Reiches zu exponieren. 
Obwohl sich die für Tiso eingestellten Führer der amerikanischen Slowaken nach 
dem vollstreckten Urteil um eine Rehabilitierung Tisos bemühten, war dieses 
Thema seit Sommer 1947 in Washington nicht mehr aktuell. Gesuche um ameri-
kanische Interventionen wurden einfach zu den Akten gelegt. 
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